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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to review the current status of stream
cipher standardisation. The hope is that, by doing so, the algorithms and
techniques that are likely to be standardised at some point during the next
year or so will be subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the cryptographic com-
munity.
1 Introduction
The history of stream cipher standardisation is a short and not terribly
distinguished one. Until 2001, when work on the international encryption
standard ISO/IEC 18033 commenced, there were no general purpose inter-
national encryption standards. This was the result of an explicit decision by
ISO/IEC not to produce standards on encryption algorithms. This decision
arose from an abortive attempt in the mid 1980s to produce an international
standard for DES, which failed for political reasons.
As a result, the only standards covering stream ciphers (apart from the
CTR, OFB and CFB block cipher modes of operation — discussed below)
were those produced for specific applications. Most notable amongst these
are probably the stream ciphers A5/1, A5/2 and A5/3 designed for use
with GSM [4, 32]; the RC4 stream cipher (see, for example, [30]), standard-
ised for use with IEEE 802.11 wireless networks as part of a system called
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), and also widely used elsewhere; and the
UMTS/3GPP f8 function [3, 10]. We next briefly review these application-
specific stream ciphers.
The stream ciphers A5/1 and A5/2 were the two schemes originally included
in the GSM standards [32]. The use of these two schemes was mandatory,
although details of the algorithms were kept secret. During the 1990s the
algorithms were reverse engineered (see, for example, [4]); subsequently both
algorithms have been shown to possess serious security vulnerabilities (see
[1] for the most effective known cryptanalytic technique). In fact, A5/2
would appear to be a deliberately weakened version of A5/1, which was itself
designed to offer a limited amount of security for political and export control
reasons. Given these constraints, and the fact that they were designed in
the mid-1980s, the fact that the algorithms have successfully been attacked
should not be a surprise.
As a result a replacement algorithm, known as A5/3, has been standardised
[12]; A5/3 is based on a mode of operation of the KASUMI block cipher
[11, 26], and is believed to be secure. Problems, however, remain with GSM
encryption, since, for backwards compatibility reasons, it is possible to force
handsets to use A5/1 or A5/2, which can be used to compromise keys for
A5/3 [1].
RC4 was devised by Rivest in the 1980s, and initially the details of its
operation were not made public. Full details were not disclosed until 1994,
and, as described in [14], it is currently widely used, including as one of the
encryption techniques for SSL. However, its adoption as part of the IEEE
802.11b WEP protocol has caused the most publicity. As has been widely
documented (see, for example, [13, 14, 31]), the way in which RC4 is used
in WEP is insecure. More precisely, Fluhrer, Manton and Shamir [13] have
succeeded in demonstrating the presence of undesirable properties in the
RC4 key scheduling in the case when part of the key is known; it is precisely
this property that gives rise to the WEP problems.
We have already mentioned that A5/3 is based on the use of a block cipher
in a special way, i.e. a so-called ‘mode of use’ (discussed in a little more
detail in Section 6). The same is true for the f8 function used for stream
cipher encryption in the UMTS/3GPP mobile communications system [3,
10], which, like A5/3, is based on the KASUMI block cipher.
For a more detailed discussion of stream cipher and encryption standardis-
ation see Chapter 4 of [7].
2 The ISO register of algorithms
One result of the ISO decision to abandon work on encryption standardi-
sation was the creation of the ISO ‘Register of cryptographic algorithms’.
This register is a means by which encryption algorithms can be given stan-
dardised names, a step somewhat short of standardising algorithms. The
register was set up in the early 1990s under the terms of ISO/IEC 9979, the
second edition of which was published in 1999 [18].
Although the register lists algorithms, is does not achieve two important
things which one might expect of a standard. Firstly, inclusion in the register
does not in any way imply that ISO recommends the algorithm for use.
Secondly, there is no requirement on the proposer of an algorithm to provide
a full description of it — in fact, details of the operation of a number of
algorithms listed in the register, of which there are a total of 24, remain
confidential. The only functional information that the user has to provide
are input/output characteristics, so that a user can implement the algorithm
as a ‘black box’ within a system, and test vectors, so that a user can test
that a black box implementation of the algorithm is functioning correctly.
The register is available online at www.iso-register.com. It is interesting
to note that RC4 is entry 0007 in the register, having been added in October
1994. Test vectors are given, but no details of the algorithm. Other stream
ciphers listed in the register, such as B-CRYPT, BARAS, FWZ1, FSAngo,
and BLIC, do not seem to have been as widely used as RC4.
3 The ISO/IEC encryption standard
In 2001 the ISO/IEC joint technical committee decided that the political
climate had changed sufficiently to enable work to commence on an inter-
national encryption standard. The result is ISO/IEC 18033: IT security
techniques — Encryption algorithms. This standard has four parts, as fol-
lows:
• Part 1: General, [23], giving general definitions and background infor-
mation for the other three parts,
• Part 2: Asymmetric ciphers, [20],
• Part 3: Block ciphers, [21], and
• Part 4: Stream ciphers, [22].
It is interesting to note that when work started on this multi-part standard,
the numbering was slightly different: Part 2 was for block ciphers, Part 3
for stream ciphers, and Part 4 for asymmetric ciphers. However it soon
became clear that there was a shortage of proposals for standard stream
cipher functions, and hence there was initially some doubt about whether
the stream cipher part could be completed. As a result it was decided to
use Part 4 for the stream cipher part, so that cancellation of this part would
not cause problems for the numbering of the other parts.
Currently, Part 1 is out for FDIS (final draft international standard) ballot.
This is the final stage before publication, and Part 1 should be published
in late 2004 or early 2005. The other three parts are all currently out for
FCD (final committee draft) ballot. This is the stage before FDIS, with
publication expected during 2005.
4 ISO/IEC 18033-4 model for stream ciphers
The stream cipher draft standard defines a stream cipher to consist of a
combination of a keystream generator (KG) and an output function. The KG
is a technique for generating a pseudo-random sequence of symbols (typically
bits) from a secret key, a starting variable, and, possibly, other inputs. The
output function defines how the output of the KG (the keystream) shall
be combined with the plaintext to yield the ciphertext. The plaintext and
ciphertext are assumed to be sequences of symbols (typically bits).
4.1 Keystream generators
Two general classes of KG are defined, namely synchronous KGs and self-
synchronising KGs. A synchronous KG is a finite state machine; its internal
state determines both the next symbol output by the KG and the next state.
A technique is required to determine the initial state based on a secret key
and a starting variable. A self-synchronising KG, by contrast, has no internal
stored state; each output symbol is a function of the previous ciphertext
(actually a fixed number (r) of the immediately previous ciphertext symbols)
and a secret key. An additional function is required to determine the initial r
‘dummy’ ciphertext symbols as a function of the key and a starting variable.
A stream cipher using a synchronous KG is called a synchronous stream
cipher, and a stream cipher based on a self-synchronising KG is a self-
synchronising stream cipher. One advantage of the latter class is that they
are able to recover (after a delay) from loss of synchronisation between en-
crypter and decrypter, e.g. caused by the loss or gain of one or more ‘blocks’
of ciphertext symbols, where the length of a block of ciphertext symbols is
equal to the number of symbols produced by the KG in one iteration.
Four specific examples of synchronous KGs are specified in the current draft
of ISO/IEC 18033-4, together with one example of a self-synchronising KG.
Of the four self-synchronous KGs, two are based on the use of a block cipher,
and are described in Section 6, and the other two are ‘dedicated’ KGs,
considered in Section 7. The single example of a self-synchronising KG is
again based on use of a block cipher — see Section 6.
4.2 Output functions
The distinction between the KG and the output function that is used to
combine the keystream with the plaintext may seem rather artificial. This
is especially true given that, in practice, almost all stream ciphers use the
exclusive-or output function described below, and it is difficult to envisage
the need for any alternative. However, the exclusive-or output function
is designed only to protect the confidentiality of the plaintext, and offers
little protection against active attacks. The distinction between the KG
and the output function allows the introduction of alternative methods of
combining keystream with plaintext to provide security services other than
confidentiality, notably an integrity service.
As well as two general classes of KGs, two output functions are specified in
ISO/IEC 18033-4. Both are only defined for the case where the plaintext
and keystream are both sequences of bits. Note that, for any mode, it is
necessary to define not only how ciphertext is obtained from plaintext, but
also the converse, i.e. the process must be reversible.
The first standardised function is the ‘standard’ exclusive-or output func-
tion. That is, each bit of the ciphertext is obtained by taking the exclusive-
or (modulo 2 sum) of one bit of plaintext and one bit of keystream. I.e. if
the plaintext is p0, p1, . . ., and the keystream is k0, k1, . . ., the ciphertext is
c0, c1, . . ., where ci = pi + ki mod 2.
The second is a much more complex function known as MULTI-S01, that
is only designed for use with a synchronous KG. This function, discussed
in Section 5, is designed to offer both confidentiality and integrity protec-
tion to the plaintext. It is thus analogous to the authenticated-encryption
techniques designed for block ciphers, such as OCB [29], EAX [2] and CCM
[28, 35]. These techniques are also the subject of ongoing international stan-
dardisation efforts — the first working draft of what is intended to become
ISO/IEC 19772 on authenticated encryption was published early in 2004
[24].
5 The MULTI-S01 output function
The MULTI-S01 output function was originally proposed by Furuya et al.
[15]. Its use requires the selection of a security parameter n (typically n =
64 or 128).
The output function processes plaintext in blocks of n bits, and hence
‘padding’ of plaintext is typically required. Two n-bit blocks are appended
to the end of the padded plaintext, where the first is made up of a keystream
block, and the second is a redundancy block, e.g. a fixed public value. Each
n-bit plaintext block is encrypted by first ex-oring a block of keystream, then
finite field multiplying by a fixed block of keystream, and finally ex-oring
the result with the output of the first step of the encryption of the previous
block.
No formal security results are known for MULTI-S01; currently, the best
known attack has a probability of success of at most (m−1)/(2n−1), where
an attacker knows the plaintext corresponding to a ciphertext containing m
blocks [15].
6 Keystream generators from block ciphers
There are three very well-known techniques for using a block cipher as a
stream cipher KG, namely the CTR (Counter), OFB (Output Feedback) and
CFB (Ciphertext Feedback) modes of operation. All three of these modes
of operation are included in the latest version of the international modes
of operation standard, ISO/IEC 10116 [19], as well as in other national
standards such as US NIST FIPS Special Publication 800-38A [27].
CTR and OFB modes enable any block cipher to be used to produce a
synchronous KG. Both operate in a very similar way. That is, a sequence
of inputs is given to the block cipher, along with a secret key, and part or
all of the block cipher outputs constitute the keystream. The CTR mode
simply uses a counter to vary the inputs to the block cipher, whereas the
OFB mode uses the output produced by the block cipher as the next input.
Using the terminology of the ISO/IEC 18033-4 model, the state for the CTR
mode is simply the counter value, and the state for the OFB mode is the
previous block cipher output.
The CFB mode enables any block cipher to be used to produce a self-
synchronising KG. As with the CTR and OFB modes, a sequence of inputs
is provided to the block cipher, along with a secret key, and part or all of
the block cipher outputs constitute the keystream. Here the input to the
KG is a block of ciphertext bits of the appropriate length.
These three schemes for constructing KGs would all appear to be satisfac-
tory from a security perspective. However, they are all relatively slow by
comparison with KGs designed specifically for high-speed operation. Given
that one major application for stream ciphers is very high speed data encryp-
tion, this means that block cipher-based KGs are not the complete solution.
Standardised dedicated KGs are also required.
For further details on block cipher modes of operation, and standards for
such modes, see Chapter 5 of [7].
7 Dedicated keystream generators
The current draft of ISO/IEC 18033-4 contains two dedicated designs for
synchronous KGs, namely SNOW 2.0 [9] and MUGI [34], both first published
in 2002. Both are developments of previous designs.
7.1 SNOW 2.0
SNOW 2.0 is a direct descendant of SNOW 1.0 [8], first published in 2000,
and has been designed to resist the attacks on SNOW 1.0 proposed by
Coppersmith, Halevi and Jutla [5] and Hawkes and Rose [17].
SNOW 2.0 uses either a 128-bit or a 256-bit key, and employs a state variable
consisting of 18 32-bit blocks (i.e. a total of 576 bits). The design employs
a 16-stage GF(232)-linear feedback shift register; 16 of the 18 32-bit state
blocks make up the state of this register. It also uses a finite state machine
with a state made up of the other two 32-bit state blocks; the way in which
this state machine operates also depends on the shift register state vari-
ables. The keystream, which is generated 32 bits at a time, is a non-linear
combination of the output of the finite state machine and two of the state
variables of the linear feedback shift register.
7.2 MUGI
MUGI is based on a KG called Panama, proposed by Daemen and Clapp in
1998 [6]. The main goal of the changes to Panama was to make the design
more efficient for hardware implementation and to make security analysis of
the design simpler [34].
MUGI uses a 128-bit key and employs a state variable consisting of 19 64-bit
blocks (i.e. a total of 1216 bits of internal state). The ‘next state’ function is
designed somewhat similarly to a block cipher round function, and combines
triples and pairs of 64-bit blocks to generate new values for 64-bit blocks.
8 Conclusions and challenges
A brief (partial) history of stream cipher standardisation has been provided.
It should be clear that, although the draft international stream cipher stan-
dard is now approaching completion, the schemes it contains (apart from
those based on block ciphers) are relatively new.
In particular, it would be enormously beneficial if three of the functions
defined in the draft standard could be subjected to further careful scrutiny
now, rather than when the schemes are in more widespread use. These are
as follows.
• MULTI-S01. The MULTI-S01 output function appears to be of pos-
sible practical benefit but has received very little attention in the lit-
erature.
• SNOW 2.0 and MUGI. Both the dedicated synchronous KGs are of
relatively recent design, and appear to have received much less atten-
tion than recently designed block ciphers such as AES. Papers have
recently appeared giving some analysis of SNOW 2.0 [33] and MUGI
[16], but there is little other discussion of these schemes in the pub-
lished literature.
A further challenge for the cryptanalyst is posed by the combination of f8
and KASUMI, as used in 3GPP/UMTS [3, 10]. Whilst the primitive f8 has
been proven secure in an extension of the ideal cipher model [25], this does
not necessarily mean that the combination of f8 and KASUMI is secure.
Over and above the schemes in the standard, there are also some obvi-
ous gaps. First and foremost, apart from CFB mode there are no self-
synchronising KGs; in particular there are no dedicated KGs of this type.
Second, it is not clear whether SNOW 2.0 or MUGI are suitable for very
high-speed hardware implementation, as would be required to bulk-encrypt
ultra-high bandwidth communications channels. New proposals are there-
fore also needed for future standardisation.
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